Israeli intelligence rules out detailed warning policy on Hamas attacks
The Financial Times revealed in a report that a senior Israeli military intelligence official rejected detailed warnings of expected attacks by the Islamic resistance (agitation) last October.
The report, written by Mehul Srivastava, said the senior official described the warning as a “fictional scenario.”
Srivastava explains that Israeli border guards Gaza – many of whom were watching and analyzing a steady stream of video and other data about areas near the area’s electronic fence – submitted a detailed report to Southern Command’s top intelligence official weeks before the attack.
Warnings include that Hamas is training to blow up border points in multiple locations in order to enter Israeli territory and seize kibbutzim.
Biggest intelligence failure since 1973
Israel’s failure to prevent the attack is now seen as the biggest intelligence failure since Egypt and Syria launched surprise attacks in 1973 (the October War, or the Tenth Ramadan War) or Israel’s so-called Yom Kippur war, the newspaper said.
The report states that junior soldiers also warned that their analysis of several video clips showed that Hamas was training to take hostages in the belief that an attack was imminent.
The warning came after Israeli soldiers spotted a senior Hamas military commander overseeing training.
The newspaper said the leader was identified through a database of faces and identities maintained by Unit 8200, an Israeli intelligence unit.
The newspaper also reported that Israel’s public broadcaster (KAN) published details of a similar warning issued by junior soldiers to senior soldiers on Thursday night, adding that the warnings included the possibility of shooting down a plane and raising its flag over Israeli territory above.
intelligence community discussion
The Financial Times added that the failure to take the warnings seriously has become a topic of discussion within the intelligence community, amounting to disciplinary measures reminiscent of discussions following intelligence failures before the 1973 war.
The warnings were ignored, the report said, not only because they came from low-level soldiers but also because they conflicted with the Israeli government’s confidence that it had contained Kazakhstan through punitive sieges, bombings of its military capabilities and the use of aid and funding. Mas. As a means of calming it down.
Another overlooked reason
The Financial Times explains that such an attack by Hamas would immediately lead to war with Israel, which the Israeli intelligence community is convinced the movement is seeking to avoid.
The newspaper concluded its report by stating that Hamas’ attacks largely followed the pattern predicted in the memo, including the specific kibbutz that were attacked and the use of rockets to distract Israeli forces from their Continue the invasion.
